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ANTITRUST IMMUNITY FOR HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS IN WISCONSIN: THE STATE ACTION
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE AND WISCONSIN'S HEALTH
CARE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Enforcement of federal antitrust policy in the health care industry is
a source of substantial controversy as the nation attempts to reduce
health care costs and to enhance access to health care services. Health
care providers have identified antitrust laws as a barrier to the pursuit of
collaborative activities which they believe could help to achieve these
ends.' In response to pleas from the health care industry, the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission published enforce-
ment guidelines regarding the application of fedteral antitrust laws in the
health care industry.2 The guidelines identified "safety zones" consisting
of certain types of collaborative conduct which would not trigger
enforcement action by those agencies.' However, the Clinton adminis-
tration did not incorporate a permissive antitrust policy into its
comprehensive health care reform plan.4 Accordingly, health care
providers turned to the states in order to obtain exemptions from federal
antitrust laws.
Under the "state action immunity doctrine" propounded by the
1. Sarah S. Vance, Immunity for State-Sanctioned Provider Collaboration After Ticor, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 409,409 (1994) (citing AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS'N, HOSPITAL COLLABORA-
TION: THE NEED FOR AN APPROPRIATE ANTITRUST POLICY (1992)).
2. U.S. Dep't of Justice and Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy in the Health Care Area (Sept. 15, 1993), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13, 151
(Sept. 30, 1994).
3. The safety zones include: 1) hospital mergers where one of the merging hospitals has
less than 100 licensed beds and an average daily inpatient census of less than 40 patients; 2)
hospital joint ventures involving high technology equipment if the joint venture is reasonably
necessary to cover the cost and does not include a hospital or group of hospitals that could
have offered a competing service; 3) physicians' provision of nonprice information to
purchasers of health care services; 4) hospital participation in exchanges of price and cost
information where the survey is managed by a third party, the information collected is more
than 3 months old, and the price or cost data are based on data from at least 5 hospitals and
aggregated so that prices charged by particular hospitals cannot be identified; and 5) joint
purchasing arrangements among health care providers if the group's purchases account for less
than 35% of the total purchases of the product or service, and the cost of the product or
service accounts for less than 20% of each participants' total revenues. Vance, supra note 1,
at 409 n.2.
4. James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care:
Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1459, 1462 (1994).
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United States Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown,5 state regulatory
programs that authorize anticompetitive conduct in order to further a
legitimate state policy do not violate the Sherman Act.6 In this vein,
many states have enacted legislation aimed at providing antitrust
immunity for certain types of cooperative agreements among health care
providers by substituting regulation for competition.7 State legislatures
enacting such legislation believe that their goals of controlling health
care costs and improving the quality of and access to health care will be
enhanced by allowing collaboration among providers that would
otherwise be prohibited by federal antitrust laws.'
In order to successfully confer immunity from antitrust laws, a
regulatory program must satisfy two requirements. First, the anti-
competitive conduct must be clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy. Second, the program must be actively
supervised by the state.9 While little controversy surrounds the first
requirement, recent Supreme Court decisions are ambiguous regarding
what constitutes "active supervision" for purposes of state action
immunity." Accordingly, it is difficult to ascertain whether immunity
granted under a state regulatory program will be upheld if challenged in
court."
This ambiguity is particularly disconcerting to health care providers
hoping to obtain antitrust immunity as they enter cooperative agree-
ments under state regulatory programs. Participation in these coopera-
tive agreements is generally voluntary and subject to approval by the
state.'2  Accordingly, health care providers have little incentive to
participate in such programs given the threat of litigation and the
5. 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
7. Blumstein, supra note 4, at 1462-63.
8. See Bradley G. Clary, The Minnesotacare Antitrust Exceptions: A Policy Proposal
Regarding the State Action Doctrine as Applied to Healthcare Reform, 18 HAMLINE L. REV.
131, 132 (1994) (discussing Minnesota's implementation of a regulatory program granting state
action immunity to certain health care providers).
9. California Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
10. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (attempting to clarify the
meaning of the two-prong test articulated in Midcal and discussing the purpose behind the
active supervision requirement).
11. See id. at 646-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the lack of certainty regarding
the meaning of active supervision and arguing that the majority opinion simply contributed
to the uncertainty surrounding the active supervision requirement).
12. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-1-502 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
4957(a) (Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2913 (West 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 442.705
(1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 150.85(1) (West Supp. 1995).
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potential that they may be subject to treble damages should state action
immunity be denied by a federal court. 3 Several states have enacted
legislation permitting health care providers to enter cooperative
agreements that seem capable of withstanding attack under the most
stringent interpretations of the active supervision requirement. 4
Wisconsin is among the states that have enacted legislation providing
antitrust protection for health care providers choosing to enter coopera-
tive agreements.' 5 However, Wisconsin's legislation may fail to meet
the active supervision requirement under some of the most permissive
interpretations. 6 The Wisconsin act includes what is known as the
"negative option," whereby an application for immunity for a coopera-
tive agreement is deemed approved unless the state denies the applica-
tion within thirty days of filing.'7 In Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor
Title Insurance Co.,8 the United States Supreme Court specifically
stated that a regulatory program approving anticompetitive conduct by
negative option does not confer state action immunity. 9
Part II of this comment will provide an overview of the state action
immunity doctrine and the two part test for determining whether
immunity exists. Part III will discuss four state programs which appear
to satisfy even the most rigorous construction of the test. Part IV will
analyze the effectiveness of the Wisconsin legislation and contrast the
Wisconsin legislation with similar, more successful state legislation.
Finally, Part V will propose ways in which the Wisconsin legislature may
amend its legislation in order to successfully provide state action
immunity to health care providers entering health care cooperative
agreements that it wishes to protect.
13. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 646-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (pointing out the disincentives
to participating in programs purporting to confer state action immunity).
14. Some states have enacted legislation establishing comprehensive approval procedures
and mandatory supervisory procedures which states and providers must follow in order to
obtain and retain immunity from antitrust laws. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25.5-1-501
to -505 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-4955 to -4961 (Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 62J.2911-.2921 (West 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 442.700-.760 (1995).
15. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 150.84-.86 (West Supp. 1995).
16. The Wisconsin legislation provides for review during the approval process and
provides that immunity may be revoked if a cooperative agreement no longer satisfies the
objectives of the statute. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 150.84-.85 (West Supp. 1995). However,
it does not provide any indication of how review subsequent to approval may occur and
confers no rule making authority on any state agency. Id.
17. I&. § 150.85(3)(a).
18. 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
19. Id. at 638.
1996]
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II. THE STATE ACTION IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
In Parker v. Brown, the United States Supreme Court announced
that federal antitrust laws are subject to supersession by state regulatory
programs.' This doctrine is recognized today as the state action
immunity doctrine.
In Parker, the Court considered whether the Sherman Act2
rendered invalid a marketing program implemented pursuant to the
California Agricultural Prorate Act (the "Act").22 The Act authorized
state officials to establish programs for marketing agricultural commodi-
ties produced within the state so as to restrict competition among
growers and maintain prices in the distribution of their crops to
packers.' The California legislature declared that the purpose of the
Act was to "conserve the agricultural wealth of the State" and to
"prevent economic waste" in the marketing of the state's agricultural
products. 4 The Act authorized creation of the Agricultural Prorate
Advisory Commission whose members would be appointed by the
governor, confirmed by the state senate, and required to take an oath of
office.25
The Act further provided that the Commission may approve prorate
marketing plans upon petition by ten producers in the same region for
the establishment of such a plan for any commodity within that
region. 6 Furthermore, the Act mandated that approval could only be
granted after a public hearing and after the Commission made economic
findings that adoption of the plan would prevent agricultural waste and
conserve the agricultural wealth of the state without permitting
unreasonable profits for producers.2 1 The Act granted the Commission
the authority to modify any proposed plan and approve it as modified.
Finally, the Act imposed penalties on persons who violated the terms of
an approved prorate plan.28
The Supreme Court determined that while the conduct permitted by
20. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994) (prohibiting contracts and conspiracies which restrain trade
as well as monopolies, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize).
22. Parker, 317 U.S. at 344.
23. Id. at 346-47.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 347.
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the Act would violate the Sherman Act if it were organized and
implemented by way of contract or conspiracy solely by private persons,
the Sherman Act does not prohibit a state from approving an agreement
having anticompetitive effects provided that it is implemented by
legislative command and designed to further a legitimate state pur-
pose.29 The Court maintained that there was nothing in the language
of the Sherman Act indicating any intention to restrain state action or
action directed by a state to regulate its own economy.30 Rather, the
Court found that the purpose of the Sherman Act was to prohibit
persons and corporations from engaging in unsanctioned, unsupervised
conduct that restrained trade on their own initiative and under their own
terms.
31
The Court stated that under our federalist system of government, the
states are sovereign, and an "unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's
control over its officers and agents" must not be read into an act of
Congress.32 The Court concluded that California, as sovereign, imposed
the restraint "as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not
undertake to prohibit."33
A. The State Action Immunity Doctrine Today
Since Parker, the United States Supreme Court has considered a
number of cases in which defendants asserted state action immunity in
defense of antitrust claims.34 In California Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., the Court established a two-part test for
determining the existence of state action immunity when legislation
authorizes anticompetitive conduct by private parties.36 The first prong
29. Id. at 350-52.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 350-51.
33. Id. at 352.
34. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94
(1988); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985);
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); California Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
35. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
36. Id. at 105. However, when a branch of a state government or a municipality, rather
than a private party, claims that its conduct is protected by the state action immunity doctrine,
active state supervision of anticompetitive conduct is not a prerequisite to exemption from
antitrust laws. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46-47. In Hallie, the Court stated
Where a private party is engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real
danger that he is acting to further his own interests, rather than the governmental
interests of the State. Where the actor is a municipality, there is little or no danger
1996]
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of the test requires that the challenged restraint on trade be one "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy."37 The second
prong requires that the policy and ensuing conduct be "actively
supervised" by the state.3
The Court in Midcal reviewed California legislation designed to
permit a resale price maintenance program in the liquor industry.39 It
held that the California legislation satisfied the first prong of the test
because "the legislative policy is forthrightly stated and clear in its
purpose to permit resale price maintenance."4 However, the Court
determined that the program failed to meet the second prong of the test
because California simply authorized and enforced price setting
established by private parties. 41
The Court found that the state did not establish price schedules,
regulate the terms of contracts formed pursuant to the program, monitor
market conditions, or engage in any "pointed reexamination of the
program."'4  Finally, the Court stated that Parker does not permit a
state to grant immunity to persons who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizing them to violate it or by declaring that their conduct is
lawful.
The first prong of the Midcal test has generated little controversy.
However, after the Court rendered its decision in Midcal, courts have
that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger is that
it will seek to further purely parochial public interests at the expense of more
overriding state goals. This danger is minimal, however, because of the requirement
that the municipality act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it is
clear that State authorization exists, there is no need to require the state to supervise
actively the municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated function.
Id. at 47.
37. 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 410 (1978)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 99-100. In Midcal, the Court reviewed section 24866 of the California Business
and Professional Code as it was then in place. The statute provided:
Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and rectifier shall:
(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers for which his
resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made by the person who owns
or controls the brand.
(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale prices, if he owns
or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or consumers.
Id. at 99 n.1 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 24866 (West 1964)).
40. Id. at 105.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 106.
43. Id.
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struggled in interpreting the active supervision component of the test.44
Although Midcal articulated several possible characteristics of a valid
regulatory program, the Court never affirmatively stated the amount of
supervision or monitoring required to satisfy the second prong of the
test.
45
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the meaning of the active
supervision requirement in Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title
Insurance Co.46 In Ticor, the Court reviewed state programs permitting
joint rate setting by members of the title insurance industry in Wisconsin
and Montana.47
The Court included a statement regarding the purpose behind the
active supervision requirement. The Court cited its earlier decision in
Patrick v. Burge, 48 where it stated that the active supervision require-
ment is premised on the recognition that when a private party engages
in anticompetitive conduct, there is a danger that the party is acting to
further its own interests rather than those of the state government.49
The Court in Patrick sought to ensure that the state action immunity
doctrine "will shelter only the particular anticompetitive acts of private
parties that, in the judgement of the State, actually further state
regulatory policies."5 In Ticor, the Court proclaimed:
Our decisions make clear that the purpose of the active supervi-
sion inquiry is not to determine whether the State has met some
normative standard, such as efficiency, in its regulatory practices.
Its purpose is to determine whether the State has exercised
sufficient independent judgment and control so that the details of
the rates or prices have been established as a product of deliber-
44. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 632-40 (1992) (attempting to explain
the rationale behind the two-part test and declaring that there must be active supervision in
fact); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100-05 (1988) (reviewing physician peer review program
and stating that only conduct that in the judgment of the state truly furthers a state regulatory
purpose should be immune); North Carolina v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc., 740 F.2d 274,276-79 (4th
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (holding that approval of certificate of need application regarding health
care cooperative agreement absent evidence of subsequent supervision by state does not
confer immunity from antitrust laws); General Hosps. of Humana, Inc. v. Baptist Med. Sys.,
Inc., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,996 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (holding that approval of certificate
of need application for health care cooperative agreement was sufficient to satisfy active
supervision requirement).
45. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06.
46. 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
47. Id. at 638.
48. 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
49. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 634-36 (citing Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988)).
50. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101.
1996)
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ate state intervention, not simply by agreement among private
parties. 1
Additionally, the Court held that the active supervision requirement
should be narrowly construed.5 2 The Court opined that broad interpre-
tation of the active supervision requirement would actually restrict the
states' regulatory freedom. 3 If state action immunity were broadly
construed, states would open the door to private claims of state action
immunity every time they engaged in any form of economic regula-
tion. 4 However, the court believed that a narrow interpretation would
ensure that state action immunity would exist only when states manifest-
ed their intention to grant immunity by carefully regulating the conduct
of private parties.5 The Court believed that a narrow construction
would ensure that the states remain responsible and politically account-
able for anticompetitive conduct which they may authorize. 6
In Ticor, the Court denied state action immunity for the Wisconsin
and Montana title insurance rate setting programs. 7 The Court
rejected the use of the so-called "negative option" whereby proposals by
private parties are accepted unless the state chooses to veto the proposal
within a specified period of time. 8 The Court maintained that the
negative option creates only the "potential for state supervision," and
that the mere potential of state supervision was not sufficient to confer
state action immunity.59 Similarly, the Court held that the potential for
judicial review is insufficient to satisfy the active supervision require-
ment.60
The Court ultimately held that in order for state action immunity to
exist, there must be active state supervision "in fact.",61 The Court
denied state action immunity because the state agencies' role and
participation in the rate setting program were too limited. Accordingly,
51. 504 U.S. at 634-35.
52. Id. at 635-36.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. The Court felt that states must accept political responsibility for the effect of
legislation which they enact and for the consequences of conduct engaged in as a result. Id.
Accordingly, requiring greater supervision will make it clear that the State is ultimately
responsible for the conduct which it has sanctioned. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 638.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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the Court concluded that no supervision in fact existed.62
The Court found that meaningful monitoring and supervision were
lacking.63 For instance, in Montana the commissioner of insurance was
not provided with information he requested, yet the rate filings were
approved.' In Wisconsin, information requested by the commissioner
of insurance was provided after a lapse of seven years, yet the rate filing
remained effective during the lapse. 5 In other words, the state had the
authority to conduct a meaningful review, but failed to exercise that
authority.6
6
The Supreme Court's decision in Ticor fails to clarify the meaning of
the active supervision requirement. The Court merely stated that there
must be "supervision in fact" in that the state must exercise its regulatory
power and that it must be clear that a state exercised sufficient
independent judgment to ensure that the anticompetitive conduct is of
a kind that will further the state's regulatory goals. However, the Court
still did not define the active supervision requirement with precision.
B. The Practical Impact of Ticor and Health Care Cooperative Agree-
ment Legislation
The Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.67
raises troubling questions for states and health care providers wishing to
participate in regulatory programs purporting to confer state action
immunity. Exactly what the Court meant by "supervision in fact" is
subject to conflicting interpretations. Perhaps a regulatory program must
include a mechanism mandating some level of ongoing monitoring by the
state.68 If this is the case, the question remains as to how much.
Alternatively, perhaps a comprehensive initial review and approval
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
68. See Yeager's Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 22 F.3d 1260,1270-72 (3d
Cir. 1994) (holding that state action immunity was effective because state statute required state
agency to conduct annual review of conduct of private utility companies and agency conducted
reviews and created report stating that regulatory goals were achieved); Vance, supra note 1,
at 417. Vance comments that Ticor confers immunity out of "respect for ongoing supervision
by the State" and that Ticor "suggest[s] that one-time review could be insufficient." Id
(quoting Howard Feller, The Impact of Ticor on State Legislation Authorizing Provider
Collaboration, 7 ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRONICLE No. 2 at 7 n.23 (1995)).
19961
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process is sufficient. 69 However, it is impossible to determine what level
of review is, sufficient based on the Court's opinion. Furthermore, the
cases decided in the federal courts since Ticor provide little guidance,
particularly if applied to the health care industry.'
Clearly, this uncertainty presents perplexing problems for states
wishing to establish regulatory programs granting state action immunity
for health care cooperative agreements and the health care providers
who may choose to participate.71 The result may be that states refrain
from establishing programs and health care providers refrain from
participating due to a fear that the state action immunity may be denied
by a federal court.72
From the standpoint of the states, they may clearly articulate a policy
authorizing certain forms of anticompetitive behavior and establish a
system to regulate that behavior, only to have a federal court hold that
the supervision was insufficient.73 Health care providers, on the other
hand, may choose to participate in a program which is found by a federal
court to provide inadequate supervision and thereby be subjected to
69. See Praxair, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 609, 612 (11th Cir. 1995) cert
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1678 (1996) (holding that agency approval of agreement by private utility
companies constituted an order of the agency and, therefore, satisfied the active supervision
requirement); Clary, supra note 8, at 139 (concluding that "[tjhe cases do not hold that the
state action doctrine generally requires comprehensive ongoing supervision over conduct that
already has been approved in fact by a State before implementation.").
70. See cases cited supra notes 68-69. Furthermore, one commentator recognized that
these decisions may be of little help to members of the health care industry because many of
them involve regulation of agreements between utility companies, which are normally subject
to extensive state regulation in the first place. See Vance, supra note 1, at 417. Cases decided
since the publication of that article present the same problem because they also involve
regulation of agreements between utility companies. See Praxair, 64 F.3d at 609; Columbia
Steel Casting Co., v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995); Yeager's Fuel, 22
F.3d at 1260. However, two pre-Ticor cases interpreted the active supervision requirement
with respect to health care cooperative agreements and those courts reached opposite conclu-
sions as well. See North Carolina v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc., 740 F.2d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 1984)
(en banc) (holding that approval of certificate of need application regarding health care
cooperative agreement absent evidence of subsequent supervision by state does not confer
immunity from antitrust laws); General Hosps. of Humana, Inc. v. Baptist Med. Sys., Inc.,
1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 66,996 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (holding that approval of certificate of
need application was sufficient to satisfy active supervision requirement).
71. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621,646-47 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating general proposition that majority opinion generates such uncertainty regarding the
active supervision requirement that individuals in any industry may be frightened to participate
in such programs).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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treble damages.74 Consequently, participation may be an incredibly
risky venture.
III. STATE HEALTH CARE COOPERATIVE LEGISLATION AND THE
STATE ACTION IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
During the past decade, governmental bodies have struggled to find
mechanisms to reduce the cost of health care and enhance patient access
to health care services while maintaining a high quality of service.'
The federal government has expressed a desire to reduce costs through
increased competition.76 However, members of the health care industry
believe that a policy favoring collaboration, rather than competition,
provides the best means for achieving efficiency and containing costs in
the health care arena."
For example, some may find that collaboration among a community's
hospitals may result in each hospital specializing in certain services and
achieving more efficient delivery of those services.7" Additionally, in
situations where two or more hospitals need to acquire expensive
equipment, it may be cost effective for the hospitals to purchase the
equipment pursuant to a joint agreement.79 In this case, a community
may benefit from access to medical technology that could be cost
prohibitive if each hospital had to purchase its own equipment.80
Despite the fear engendered by the ambiguities contained in
Midcal t and Ticor,8' at least eighteen states have enacted legislation
granting state action immunity to health care providers entering into
various cooperative agreements.' Given the vagary of the Supreme
Court's opinions in those cases, there is no guarantee that the immunity
conferred will be effective. However, several states have drafted
legislation in a manner that maximizes the probability that a grant of
state action immunity will withstand judicial scrutiny. For purposes of
74. Id.
75. See generally Blumstein, supra note 4.
76. Id. at 1461.
77. See Vance, supra note 1.
78. Stephanie M. Harper, Quest for Antitrust Immunity: Oregon, Health Care, and the
State Action Doctrine, 31 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 89 (1995).
79. Clary, supra note 8, at 132.
80. Id.
81. Cal. Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
82. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
83. See Blumstein, supra note 4, at 1463 n.15 (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, HEALTH CARE: FEDERAL AND STATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS CONCERNING THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY, at 10 (August 1994)).
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this comment, the legislation enacted by Minnesota, Colorado, Kansas,
and Oregon shall serve as models.8 4
The unifying feature of these statutes is that they address each
concern raised by the Court in Midcal and Ticor with respect to
determining compliance with the two prong test." To begin with, each
of these statutes clearly provides a state policy of permitting health care
providers to form cooperative agreements that will improve the nature
of health care services available within the respective states in satisfac-
tion of the first prong of the test.86
Although there is variation between these states regarding the
84. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25.5-1-503 to -505 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 4955 to 4961 (Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62J.2911-.2921 (West 1996);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 442.700-.760 (1995). Oregon's statute only applies to heart and kidney
transplant services. OR. REV. STAT. § 442.700 (1995).
85. The relevant concerns are: 1) that the state clearly articulates and affirmatively
expresses a state policy of replacing competition with regulated cooperation; 2) that the state
regulates the terms of the provider cooperative agreements; 3) that the state engages in mean-
ingful reexamination of programs after they are implemented; 4) that the overall legislative
scheme demonstrates that the states exercise sufficient independent judgement and control to
ensure that anticompetitive conduct is the product of deliberate state intervention; and 5) that
the supervision provided for is in fact carried out. See Ticor, 504 U.S. at 633-38; Midcal, 445
U.S. at 105-06.
86. Minnesota's statute provides that "the goals of controlling health care costs and
improving the quality of and access to health care services will be significantly enhanced by
cooperative arrangements involving providers or purchasers that might be prohibited by state
and federal antitrust laws if undertaken without government involvement." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 62J.2911 (West 1996). Likewise, the Colorado statute provides that:
Federal and state antitrust laws have inhibited the formation of cooperative health
care agreements involving hospitals. However, such cooperative agreements are
likely to foster improvements in the delivery, quality, or cost effectiveness of health
care and improve access to needed services .... The general assembly hereby deter-
mines that a limited exemption and immunity from the antitrust laws would
encourage the development of such health care agreements, to the benefit of the
citizens of the state of Colorado.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-1-502 (2) (West Supp. 1996).
Similarly, in granting state action immunity, the Kansas legislature proclaimed that,
"cooperative agreements among health care providers concerning the provision of services can
foster further improvements in the quality of health care for Kansas citizens, moderate
increases in costs, avoid duplication of resources and improve access to needed services in
rural areas of Kansas." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4955(b) (Supp. 1995).
Finally, the Oregon legislation provides:
The Legislative Assembly finds that direct competition among health care providers
in the field of heart and kidney transplant services may not result in the most cost
efficient and least expensive transplant services for the citizens of this state and that
it is in the public interest to allow cooperative programs among health care providers
providing heart and kidney transplant services.
OR. REV. STAT. § 442.705(1) (1995).
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manner in which each attempts to satisfy the active supervision
requirement, there are some common threads. First, these states have
adopted comprehensive approval procedures and none provide for
approval by negative option. 7 Second, all four states mandate substan-
tial supervision following approval by requiring that approved agree-
ments be reviewed annually by the state." Finally, failure to comply
with the terms of the agreement or terms of a state order constitute
grounds for revocation of antitrust immunityY
Generally, to obtain state action immunity in Minnesota, Colorado,
Kansas, or Oregon, health care providers intending to enter into a
cooperative agreement must submit an application that complies with the
state's health care cooperative agreement statute to the designated state
agency or board for approval. 0 The agency or board evaluates the
proposed agreement to determine whether operation of the agreement
is likely to improve the cost effectiveness, availability, quality, or delivery
of hospital or health care services in the state. Then, within a specified
period of time, the decision-making body must render a decision in
writing either approving or denying the agreement and setting forth the
reasons for its decision.91 Furthermore, each state requires that any
amendment to an approved cooperative agreement be evaluated by the
87. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25.5-1-505 to -506 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-4957 (Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62J.2914-.2918 (West 1996); OR. REV.
STAT. § 442.710 (1995).
88. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-1-508 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
4958 (Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62J.2914-.2918 (West 1996); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 442.725-730 (1995).
89. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-1-507 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4958
(Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62.2921 (West 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 442.730 (1995).
90. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-1-505 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4957
(Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2914 (West 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 442.710 (1995).
The Minnesota legislation goes a step further and requires the Commissioner of Health to
engage in formal notice and comment procedures through the State Register. See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 623.2915 (West 1996). Colorado also requires public notice. COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25.5-1-505 (West Supp. 1995).
91. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4957 (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 442.710 (1995).
Minnesota follows a more complicated procedure. Following a notice and comment period
an application to enter a cooperative agreement will be evaluated in one of three ways. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 62.2916 (2) (West 1996). The Commissioner may issue a written decision on
the record, as is the case in Kansas and Oregon. Id. Alternatively, the Commissioner may
hold a limited hearing at which the applicant may be questioned regarding the agreement. Id.
The statute also provides that the Commissioner may require, and the applicant may demand,
a contested case hearing which shall be tried before an administrative law judge. Id.
Similarly, Colorado requires the board which reviews proposed agreements to officially publish
notice and to conduct a public hearing. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-1-505(2) (West Supp.
1996).
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appropriate agency or board before taking effect. Finally, each provides
the decision making body the power to modify an agreement on its own
accord.92
Additionally, each of these states requires that all approved
cooperative agreements be reviewed annually.93 However, the states
differ with respect to how such review shall occur.
Minnesota requires that parties to approved cooperative agreements
submit data as specified by the Commissioner of Health at least once a
year so that the Commissioner may determine whether the agreements
continue to enhance the quality, cost effectiveness, and access to health
care.94 Colorado requires the Cooperative Health Care Agreements
Board to promulgate rules requiring the parties to any approved
cooperative agreement to submit annual reports that
provide information reasonably necessary to enable the board to
evaluate the impact of the agreement on the availability, cost
effectiveness, quality, and delivery of hospital or health care
services and to determine whether such parties have complied
with the terms of the agreement and with the order of the board
approving such terms.9
Likewise, Kansas requires that the Secretary of Health and the
Environment review all approved cooperative agreements annually to
determine whether their operation continues to satisfy the purpose of the
legislation.96
Finally, Oregon requires the Director of the Department of Health
and Human Resources to establish a board of governors to govern each
individual cooperative program that the Director approves.9 7  The
board must submit annual reports to the Director within sixty days of
each anniversary date of the Director's approval of the cooperative
agreement.98 Then, the Director must decide whether to reapprove,
modify, or revoke approval within sixty days of receipt of the report.9
In order for the cooperative agreement to remain effective, the Director
must find that operation of the agreement is achieving the goals set forth
92. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-1-507 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4958
(Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2918 (West 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 442.730 (1995).
93. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-1-508 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4958
(Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2920 (West 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 442.725 (1995).
94. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2920 (West 1996).
95. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-1-508 (West Supp. 1996).
96. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4958 (Supp. 1995).
97. OR. REV. STAT. § 442.720 (1995).
98. Id. § 442.725.
99. Id. § 442.730.
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by the legislature and that it remains necessary to achieve those
goals.'
These statutes also address the issue of political accountability. For
instance, Colorado requires that health care cooperative agreements gain
approval by a board which is appointed by the governor and subject to
consent by the state senate. 1 Colorado also requires the board to
publish public notice and conduct a public hearing before approving a
proposed agreement.3  Similarly, the Kansas statute establishes a
committee of health care providers to advise the Secretary of Health and
the Environment on matters concerning the administration of its health
care cooperative agreement program.'O The statute dictates that the
committee be composed of five members." The governor, the speaker
of the house of representatives, the house minority leader, the president
of the senate, and the senate minority leader shall each be permitted to
appoint one member of the committee." Additionally, Oregon
establishes a complaint procedure whereby any person may file a
complaint with the Director of Health and Human Resources requesting
that any decision of a cooperative program supervised by the Director
be reversed or modified.0 6
Minnesota goes a step further and requires that the Commissioner of
Health conduct extensive notice and comment procedures both before
and after approval of any health care cooperative agreement."° Before
the Commissioner may evaluate an application, the Commissioner must
publish notice of the application and its contents in the State Register
and provide the same information to the Minnesota Health Care
Commission, the regional coordinating boards for any regions affected
by the proposed agreement, and anyone else who requests notice of the
application. °" Also, the Commissioner must accept comments filed by
interested persons within twenty days of publication of the notice. 9
Finally, the Commissioner must conduct the notice and comment
procedure at two-year intervals following approval of an application in
100. Id
101. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-1-504 (West Supp. 1996).
102. Id. § 25.5-1-505(2).
103. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4961 (Supp. 1995).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. OR. REV. STAT. § 442.735 (1995).
107. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62J.2915, 621.2920 (West 1996).
108. Id. § 62J.2915.
109. Id.
1996]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
order to solicit comments from the public concerning the impact the
arrangement has had on the cost, access to, and quality of health
care.
110
Each statute discussed above maximizes the probability that approval
of a health care cooperative agreement by the state will in fact result in
state action immunity for the parties entering the agreement. In each
instance, the state legislature specifically addressed the concerns raised
by the Supreme Court in Ticor'n and MidcaL"
First, the state policy objectives are "forthrightly stated and clear in
[their] purpose." 113 Second, each statute requires that the appropriate
state agency or decision-making body participate in and regulate the
establishment of health care cooperative agreements."4 Third, each
statute mandates "pointed reexamination" of approved cooperative
agreements to ensure that they continue to carry out the State's goals as
articulated in the statute."' Fourth, each regulatory scheme goes to
great length to ensure that state actors exercise independent judgment
to make sure that operation of the agreements fulfills the will of the
states and not just the will of the parties to the agreement."6 Fifth,
each statute makes ongoing supervision mandatory to ensure that
"supervision in fact" does in fact occur. 7  Finally, each includes
measures to make members of the state government politically account-
able for their endorsement of the cooperative agreements.'
Thus, health care providers in these states will face considerably less
risk should they choose to participate in these programs. Accordingly,
there is a greater chance that the statutes in these states will succeed in
achieving the legislatures' goal of inducing collaboration among health
care providers to the benefit of the citizens of their states.
IV. WISCONSIN LEGISLATION REGARDING HEALTH CARE COOPER-
ATIVE AGREEMENTS
Wisconsin has also enacted legislation designed to encourage health
care providers to enter cooperative agreements promising to improve the
110. Id. § 62J.2920 (West 1996).
111. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
112. Cal. Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
113. See id. at 105; statutes cited supra note 86.
114. 445 U.S. at 106. See also statutes cited supra notes 90-91.
115. 445 U.S. at 106. See also statutes cited supra notes 93-100.
116. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 634-36. See also statutes cited supra note 90.
117. Ticor, 504 U.S. 637-38. See also statutes cited supra notes 93-100.
118. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 636. See also statutes cited supra notes 101-10.
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nature of health care within the state. On April 27, 1992, Wisconsin
Governor Tommy Thompson signed into law 1991 Wisconsin Act
250.11 The Act included provisions intended to grant health care
providers that voluntarily enter cooperative agreements with other health
care providers immunity from federal and state antitrust laws
2°
However, the statute may fail to encourage any substantial collaboration
among health care providers.1
21
In Wisconsin, health care providers entering cooperative agreements
who wish to obtain immunity from antitrust laws must obtain a certificate
of public advantage from the Department of Health and Social Services
(the "DHSS")." In order to obtain a certificate of public advantage,
the parties to the agreement must file an application with the DHSS."'
The application must include a signed copy of the proposed agreement
and a statement describing the nature and scope of the cooperation
contemplated. 24 If the DHSS does not deny the application within thirty
days, the application is approved."z However, if the DHSS denies the
application it must issue a statement to the applicants in writing setting
forth the reasons for the denial and provide the applicants an opportuni-
ty for a hearing."
The criteria which the DHSS shall use to determine whether it will
award a certificate of public advantage are similar to those used by
Minnesota, Colorado, Kansas, and Oregon to determine whether to
119. Wisconsin Legislative Council, Information Memorandum 92-21, at 19 (July 29,
1992).
120. Id. at 20. The provisions regarding health care cooperative agreements are codified
at WIs. STAT. ANN. § 150.84-.86 (West Supp. 1995). These provisions became effective on
May 12, 1992.
121. It may be particularly difficult for health care providers in Wisconsin to ascertain
the amount of supervision required to withstand scrutiny in the Seventh Circuit. There have
been very few decisions rendered by the Seventh Circuit interpreting the active supervision
requirement where private actors are involved. However, one published decision indicates that
the Seventh Circuit will carefully scrutinize the amount of state supervision present before
finding that state action immunity exists for private parties participating in state regulatory
programs. See Fuchs v. Rural Electric Convenience Coop. Inc., 858 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir.
1988) ("[P]rivate actors may be held liable under the antitrust laws unless they are acting
pursuant to a 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed' state policy to displace
competition, and that policy is subject to 'active supervision' by the state itself.") (citing Liquor
Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987)).
122. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 150.85(1) (West Supp. 1995).
123. Id. § 150.85(2).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 150.85(3)(a).
126. Id. § 150.85(3)(b).
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confer antitrust immunity.127 The DHSS will issue a certificate of
public advantage if it finds that the improvement in quality, access to,
utilization of, or cost effectiveness of health care likely to result from
operation of the cooperative agreement substantially outweighs the
disadvantages associated with a reduction in competition." With
respect to revocation of a certificate of public advantage, the DHSS may
revoke the certificate if it finds that the benefits of the reduction in
competition no longer outweigh the disadvantages.1
29
The Wisconsin legislation, however, has problems that indicate that
the antitrust immunity granted by the statute may be illusory. Although
the policy objectives and purpose are sufficiently clear to satisfy the clear
articulation component of the Midcal test,130 the statute fails to ensure
that there will be enough government supervision of the parties to
cooperative agreements to satisfy the active supervision component of
the test.
Although there are similarities between the Wisconsin statute and
those examined in Part II, the Wisconsin statute is far less likely to
127. The Wisconsin statute provides that DHSS shall issue a certificate of public
advantage if the benefits likely to result from the agreement substantially outweigh the
disadvantages attributable to a reduction in competition. Id. § 150.85(4)(a)(1). In order to
make this finding, the commissioner must find that one of the following conditions exist:
1. The quality of health care provided to residents of the state will be enhanced.
2. A hospital, if any, and health care facilities that customarily serve the communities
in the area likely affected by the cooperative agreement will be preserved.
3. Services provided by the parties to the cooperative agreement will gain cost
efficiency.
4. The utilization of health care resources and equipment in the area likely affected
by the cooperative agreement will improve.
5. Duplication of health care resources in the area likely affected by the cooperative
agreement will be avoided.
Id. §§ 150.85(4)(b)(1)-150.85(4)(b)(5); cf. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-1-506 (West Supp.
1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4957 (Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2917 (West 1996);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 442.705-442.710 (1995).
128. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 150.85(4)(a), 150.85(4)(b)1-4 (West Supp. 1995).
129. Compare id. § 150.85(5)(a), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2921 (West 1996), COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-1-507 (West Supp. 1996), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4958 (Supp. 1995),
and OR. REV. STAT. § 442.730 (1995).
130. The statute itself only states that issuance of a certificate of public advantage
provides immunity from state antitrust laws included in chapter 133 of the Wisconsin statutes.
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 150.85(1) (West Supp. 1995). However, the report of the Wisconsin
Legislative Council published subsequent to the enactment of the statute indicates that the
legislature intended to confer immunity from federal antitrust laws under the state action
immunity doctrine as well. Wisconsin Legislative Council, Information Memorandum 92-21,
at 19 (July 29, 1992). Furthermore, the criteria for approval of an application for a certificate
of public advantage clearly indicate that the legislature recognized the potential for a reduction
in competition. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 150.85(4) (West Supp. 1995).
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successfully confer state action immunity on those who obtain certificates
of public advantage. The statute simply does not dispel the concerns
raised by the Supreme Court in Ticor3 and Midca 32 as effectively
as the statutes enacted by Minnesota, Colorado, Kansas, and Oregon."'
Essentially, the Wisconsin statute, on its face, does far less to ensure that
the state will actively supervise the operation of approved health care
cooperative agreements.
Specifically, Wisconsin's legislation contains at least one fatal flaw.
The statute provides that unless the DHSS denies an application for a
certificate of public advantage within thirty days of filing, the application
is automatically approved." 4 This is substantially the same negative
option provision that the Court rejected in Ticor 35 In Ticor, the court
found that approval of a rate setting scheme as a function of state
inaction was insufficient to satisfy the active supervision component of
the Midcal test.1
36
According to Ticor, the existence of this provision raises questions as
to the extent that the state will participate in the structuring of the
agreements. 37 As the Court stated, the negative option only establishes
the potential for state regulation.13' Hence, a court would most likely
find that there is no assurance that the DHSS affirmatively determines
whether health care cooperative agreements will further the state's
regulatory goals. 139  Accordingly, so long as the Wisconsin statute
contains this provision, it is probably destined to fail.
In addition to the negative option problem, the Wisconsin statute has
other deficiencies which may inhibit its effectiveness. First, the statute
does not require the DHSS to engage in any "pointed reexamination" of
previously approved arrangements to ensure that their operation
continues to carry out the will of the legislature." ° Unlike the statutes
discussed above, the Wisconsin statute includes no provision requiring
that parties to cooperative agreements submit data to the DHSS so that
it may evaluate whether the benefits resulting from a cooperative
131. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
132. Cal. Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
133. See discussion supra Parts II.A., III.
134. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 150.85(3)(a) (West Supp. 1995).
135. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 638.
136. Id.
137. Id. Ticor, however, dealt with state participation and supervision of a rate-setting
program in the title insurance business. See discussion supra Part II.A.
138. 504 U.S. at 638.
139. See discussion supra Part II.A-B.
140. See discussion supra Part ll.A-B.
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agreement continue to outweigh the disadvantages associated with the
reduction in competition. 141 The statute merely allows the DHSS to
revoke a certificate of public advantage; however, it provides the
department no means of obtaining any information once a certificate has
been issued. 142
Nor does the statute provide any measure of political accountability.
The statute does not direct the Governor or Secretary of the DHSS to
appoint a board to supervise the operation of health care cooperative
agreements as do the statutes currently in place in Colorado and
Kansas.43 Additionally, the statute provides no complaint procedure
or notice and comment procedure so that the public may have an
opportunity to express its views on the utility of health care provider
arrangements.14 Currently, the statute only allows holders of and
applicants for certificates of public advantage to contest revocation and
denial. 45
Given the problems discussed above, it is unlikely that state action
immunity under the Wisconsin statute would be upheld if attacked in a
federal court."4 Health care providers will undoubtedly recognize
these problems and realize that it is not in their best interests to expose
themselves to the danger of federal antitrust liability. Unless the
legislature amends the statute so that it affords health care providers a
greater degree of certainty that obtaining a certificate of public
advantage will in fact provide immunity from federal antitrust laws,
providers will refrain from engaging in cooperative arrangements. Until
that time, cooperative agreements among health care providers cannot
be an effective tool for improving the delivery of health care in this state.
141. See discussion supra Part II.
142. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 150.85(5)(a) (West Supp. 1995).
143. See discussion supra Part II.
144. See discussion supra Part II.
145. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 150.85(5)(a) (West Supp. 1995).
146. Prior to Ticor, two federal courts evaluated regulatory programs governing health
care cooperative agreements purporting to confer state action immunity upon issuance of a
certificate similar to the Wisconsin legislation and reached opposite conclusions. However,
neither confronted a situation involving the use of the negative option present in Wisconsin.
See North Carolina v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc., 740 F.2d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(holding that issuance of certificate of need regarding health care agreement, absent evidence
of subsequent supervision by state, does not confer state action immunity); but see General
Hosps. of Humana, Inc. v. Baptist Med. Sys., Inc., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,996 (E.D.
Ark. 1986) (holding that approval of certificate of need application was sufficient to satisfy
active supervision requirement).
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V. A PROPOSAL TO AMEND WISCONSIN'S HEALTH CARE COOPERA-
TIVE AGREEMENT STATUTE
As discussed in Part I of this comment, a state legislative scheme
purporting to confer immunity from federal antitrust laws must dispel the
concerns raised in Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance
Co.,47 and California Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 4 in order to assure its effectiveness. Accordingly, the goal of this
proposal is to present an alternative that incorporates components of the
legislation enacted by Minnesota, Colorado, Kansas, and Oregon and
address the concerns expressed in Ticor and Midcal with respect to both
the clear articulation and active supervision requirements.
A. Clear Articulation of Legislative Purpose
As currently drafted, the Wisconsin health care cooperative
agreement statute does not explicitly state that approval of an applica-
tion for a certificate of public advantage confers immunity from federal
antitrust laws. 49 However, the report issued by the Wisconsin Legisla-
tive Council indicates that the legislature did in fact intend to provide
immunity from federal antitrust laws. 50 If this is the legislature's
intention, it should say so. Accordingly, the statute should be amended
to include statements demonstrating that the legislature believes that
cooperation among health care providers has the potential to reduce
costs and improve the quality of health care in Wisconsin, and that
issuance of a certificate of public advantage confers immunity from
federal antitrust laws.
B. Active Supervision
As discussed in Part IV above, the Wisconsin health care cooperative
agreement legislation raises questions regarding whether the state will
exercise sufficient control over cooperative agreements among health
care providers to assure immunity from federal antitrust laws. The
amendments recommended below could help provide assurance to health
care providers that immunity conferred through issuance of a certificate
147. 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
148. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
149. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 150.85(1) (West Supp. 1995). The Wisconsin statute only
specifically mentions immunity from state antitrust laws. Id.
150. Wisconsin Legislative Council, Information Memorandum 92-21 at 19-20 (July 29,
1992).
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of public advantage will be effective.
First and foremost, the legislature must do away with the negative
option provision. In Ticor, the United States Supreme Court unequivo-
cally stated that approval of anticompetitive conduct by negative option
does not provide state action immunity."' Therefore, Wisconsin
should include an amendment requiring the DHSS to issue a written
decision articulating findings that it believes operation of a cooperative
agreement will help to satisfy the goals of the statute each time it grants
a certificate of public advantage. Such an amendment would also ensure
that the DHSS only grants certificates of public advantage following
deliberation and for conduct that it believes is deserving of immunity.
Second, the legislature should incorporate a provision mandating
periodic review of the effects of cooperative agreements after a
certificate has been issued. 52 Minnesota's statute provides what
appears to be a flexible and effective alternative. 53 Under the Minne-
sota statute the Commissioner of Health must review annually the
manner in which approved cooperative agreements affect the cost,
quality, and access to health care in the areas which they operate.'-'
However, the statute allows the Conunissioner to determine the
information that providers must disclose on a case by case basis.155
Accordingly, the statute makes sure that the state conducts a "pointed
re-examination" of the conduct that it has authorized, yet provides the
Commissioner the discretion to tailor his or her evaluation such that it
is relevant to the circumstances of individual cases.
Third, Wisconsin should place some degree of political accountability
on the state actors involved.1 56 An amendment requiring the governor
or the legislature to appoint a committee comprised of experts in the
health care field to advise the DHSS regarding the usefulness of
cooperative agreements both before and after approval may help to
achieve this end.'57 This committee should be granted the authority to
151. 504 U.S. at 638.
152. See discussion supra Part II.A., Part III.
153. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2920 (West 1996).
154. Id.
155. Il
156. See Ticor, 504 U.S. at 636-37.
157. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-1-504 (West Supp. 1996) (requiring the governor
to appoint a committee to rule on applications and promulgate rules regarding annual review
of approved health care cooperative agreements); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4961 (1995) (creating
a committee to be appointed by the governor and members of legislature to advise the
Secretary of Health and the Environment on matters related to health care cooperative agree-
ments).
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promulgate rules governing the operation of health care cooperative
agreements in the future, in the event that the need for a more
comprehensive regulatory program arises. Additionally, the committee
should be required to conduct some form of a notice and comment
procedure prior to approval of an agreement and at two-year intervals
following issuance of a certificate of public advantage so that the public
may express its views regarding the impact of the operation of coopera-
tive agreements among health care providers.15 Finally, the statute
should include a complaint procedure that allows citizens harmed by the
operation of a cooperative agreement to be heard in addition to
applicants who are denied certificates of public advantage.
Incorporation of these or similar amendments would increase the
probability that a federal court would hold that Wisconsin's health care
cooperative agreement legislation confers immunity from federal
antitrust laws. Accordingly, such amendments would provide health care
providers greater incentive to pursue cooperative arrangements with one
another, and, therefore, provide the state with the opportunity to see if
cooperation among health care providers can in fact reduce the cost,
improve efficiency, and increase access health care in Wisconsin.
VI. CONCLUSION
Some commentators do not believe that such stringent statutory
requirements as discussed above are necessary to confer state action
immunity under Ticor.159 However, the Supreme Court's pronounce-
ments on the active supervision requirement in Ticor are vague. 60
Furthermore, decisions rendered by the lower federal courts on this issue
are inconsistent.' 6'
Health care providers could be subjected to treble damages if they
choose to enter cooperative agreements and state action immunity under
the statute is denied by a court. If Wisconsin wishes to encourage
collaboration among health care providers by providing immunity from
federal antitrust laws, enacting legislation that addresses each concern
raised in Ticor provides the greatest assurance that the immunity granted
will be meaningful. Accordingly, amending the statute may provide the
158. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2915 (West 1996) (establishing pre-approval notice and
comment procedure). See also id. § 62.2920 (establishing post approval notice and comment
procedure).
159. See Clary, supra note 8, at 139.
160. See discussion supra Part II.B.
161. See cases cited supra notes 68-70, 146.
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only effective means of inducing health care providers to enter coopera-
tive agreements.
Implementation of a program to conduct thorough review of health
care cooperative agreements and meaningful notice and comment
procedures will consume substantial state resources. Therefore,
Wisconsin should embark upon the process of amending its legislation
and implementing such comprehensive programs only if the state truly
intends to make antitrust immunity for health care providers entering
cooperative agreements with one another a component of its health care
reform program. Hopefully, this comment will induce members of the
state government to evaluate the state's position on health care
cooperative agreements, and amend the law accordingly if the state
wishes to employ the tool of state action immunity in its health care
reform program.
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